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Seeming public apathy over climate change is often attributed to a deficit in comprehension.
The public knows too little science, it is claimed, to understand the evidence or avoid being misled 1.
Widespread limits on technical reasoning aggravate the problem by forcing citizens to use unreliable cognitive heuristics to assess risk2. We conducted a study to test this account and found no support for it. Members of the public with the highest degrees of science literacy and technical reasoning capacity were not the most concerned about climate change. Rather, they were the ones among
whom cultural polarization was greatest. This result suggests that public divisions over climate
change stem not from the public’s incomprehension of science but from a distinctive conflict of interest: between the personal interest individuals have in forming beliefs in line with those held by
others with whom they share close ties and the collective one they all share in making use of the best
available science to promote common welfare.
The study collected data on the climate-change risk perceptions of a large representative sample
of U.S. adults (N = 1540). Measures were selected to permit assessment of two competing accounts of
public opinion on climate change. One, already adverted to, can be called the “science comprehension
thesis” (SCT): Because members of the public do not know what scientists know, or think the way scientists think, they predictably fail to take climate change as seriously as scientists believe they should3.
The alternative explanation can be referred to as the “cultural cognition thesis” (CCT). CCT posits that individuals, as a result of a complex of psychological mechanisms, tend to form perceptions of
societal risks that cohere with values characteristic of groups with which they identify 4-5. Whereas SCT
emphasizes a conflict between scientists and the public, CCT stresses one between different segments of
the public, whose members are motivated to fit their interpretations of scientific evidence to their competing cultural philosophies 6.
Explanations for the public’s perceptions of climate-change risk can be tested by observational
study insofar as such hypotheses imply correlations between concern over climate change and specified
individual characteristics7. We instructed subjects to rate their the seriousness of climate-change risk on a
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scale of 0 (“no risk”) to 10 (“extreme risk”), a general risk-concern measure that furnishes a parsimonious
focus for such testing 8-9.
SCT asserts, first, that ordinary members of the public underestimate the seriousness of climate
change because of the difficulty of the scientific evidence3. If this is correct, concern over climate change
should be positively correlated with science literacy—that is, concern should increase as people become
more science literate.
Second, and even more important, SCT attributes low concern with climate change to limits on
the ability of ordinary members of the public to engage in technical reasoning. Recent research in psychology posits two discrete forms of information processing: “System 1,” which involves rapid visceral
judgments that manifest themselves in various decision-making “heuristics”; and “System 2,” which requires conscious reflection and calculation10. Most members of the public, according to this research, typically employ System 1 reasoning without resorting to more effortful System 2 processing. Although System 1 works well for most daily contingencies, citizens’ predominant reliance on heuristic rather than
more analytic modes of reasoning is viewed as leading them to underestimate climate-change risks, which
are remote and abstract compared to a host of more emotionally charged risks (e.g., terrorism) that the
public is thought to overestimate2-3.
If this position is correct, one would also expect concern with climate change to be positively correlated with numeracy. Numeracy refers to the capacity of individuals to comprehend and make use of
quantitative information11. More numerate people are more disposed to use accuracy-enhancing forms of
System 2 reasoning and to be less vulnerable to the cognitive errors associated with System 111-12. Hence,
they should, on this view, form perceptions of climate-change risk less biased toward underestimation.
These predictions were unsupported (Fig. 1). As respondents’ science-literacy scores increased,
concern with climate change decreased (r = -0.05, p = 0.05). There was also a negative correlation between numeracy and climate-change risk (r = -0.09, p < 0.01). The differences were small, but nevertheless inconsistent with SCT, which predicts effects with the opposite signs.
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Fig. 1. SCT prediction vs. actual impact of science literacy and numeracy on climate-change risk perceptions.
Contrary to SCT predictions, higher degrees of science literacy and numeracy are associated with a small decrease
in the perceived seriousness of climate-change risks. Derived from Table S4, Model 1. “Low” and “High” reflect
values set at -1 SD and +1 SD on composite Science Literacy/Numeracy scale [see Supplementary Information
(“SI”)]. Responses on 0-10 risk scale (M = 5.7, SD = 3.4) converted to z-score to promote ease of interpretation. CIs
reflect 0.95 level of confidence.

CCT also generates a testable prediction. CCT posits that persons who subscribe to a “hierarchical, individualistic” worldview—one that ties authority to conspicuous social rankings and eschews collective interference with the decisions of individuals possessing such authority—tend to be skeptical of environmental risks. Such people intuitively perceive that widespread acceptance of such risks would license
restrictions on commerce and industry, forms of behavior that Hierarchical Individualists value. In contrast, persons who hold an “egalitarian, communitarian” worldview—one favoring less regimented forms
of social organization and greater collective attention to individual needs—tend to be morally suspicious
of commerce and industry, to which they attribute social inequity. They therefore find it congenial to believe those forms of behavior are dangerous and worthy of restriction4. On this view, one would expect
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Egalitarian Communitarians to be more concerned than Hierarchical Individualists with climate change
risks.
Our data, consistent with previous studies6, supported this prediction. “Hierarchical Individualists” (subjects who scored in the top half on both the Hierarchy and Individualism cultural-worldview
scales) rated climate-change risks significantly lower (M = 3.15, SEM = 0.17) than did Egalitarian Communitarians (subjects whose scores placed them in the bottom half) (M = 7.4, SEM = 0.13). Even controlling for scientific literacy and numeracy (as reflected in the composite scale “Science Literacy/Numeracy”; see “Supplementary Information,” SI), both Hierarchy (b = -0.46, p < 0.01) and Individualism (b = -0.30, p < 0.01) predicted less concern over climate change (Table S4).
These findings were consistent, too, with previous ones showing that climate change has become
highly politicized 13-14. Cultural-worldview and political-orientation measures are modestly correlated.
Nevertheless, the impact that cultural worldviews have on climate-change risk perceptions cannot be reduced to partisanship. The mean Hierarchical Individualist in our sample was an “Independent” who
“leans Republican” and is “slightly conservative”; the mean Egalitarian Communitarian was also an “Independent,” but one who “leans Democrat” and is “slightly liberal” (Fig. S4). The difference between
their respective perceptions of climate-change risk, however, significantly exceeded what politicalorientation measures alone would predict for individuals who identify themselves as “conservative Republicans” and “liberal Democrats” (Fig. S5).
The finding that cultural worldviews explain more variance than science literacy and numeracy,
however, does not by itself demonstrate that SCT is less supportable than CCT. SCT asserts not merely
that members of the public lack scientific knowledge but also that they lack the habits of mind needed to
assimilate it, and are thus constrained to rely on fallible heuristic alternatives. Proponents of this
“bounded rationality” position treat cultural cognition—the conforming of beliefs to the ones that predominate within one’s group—as simply one of the unreliable System 1 heuristics used to compensate for
the inability to assess scientific information in a dispassionate, analytical manner.15
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This claim generates another testable prediction. If cultural cognition is merely a heuristic substitute for scientific knowledge and System 2 reasoning, reliance on it should be lowest among those individuals whose scientific knowledge and System 2 reasoning capacity are highest. SCT thus implies that
as science literacy and numeracy increase, the skepticism over climate change associated with a hierarchical individualistic worldview should lessen and the gap between people with hierarchical individualistic worldviews and those with egalitarian communitarian ones should diminish.

Fig. 2. SCT prediction vs. actual impact of the interaction between science literacy and numeracy, on the one
hand, and cultural worldviews, on the other. Contrary to SCT’s predictions, highly science-literate and numerate
Hierarchical Individualists are more skeptical, not less, of climate-change risks. Estimated risk-perception scores
derived from Table S4, Model 3. “Hierarchical Individualist” and “Egalitarian Communitarian” reflect values set,
respectively, at +1 and -1 SD on both the Hierarchy and Individualism cultural worldview scale predictors. “Low”
and “high” reflect values set at -1 and +1 SD on Science Literacy/Numeracy scale. Responses on 0-10 risk scale
(M = 5.7, SD = 3.4) converted to z-score to promote ease of interpretation. CIs reflect 0.95 level of confidence.

But this SCT prediction, too, was unsupported. Among Egalitarian Communitarians, science literacy and numeracy (as reflected in the composite scale “Science Literacy/Numeracy”), showed a small
positive correlation with concern about climate-change risks (r = 0.08, p = 0.03). But among Hierarchical
Individualists, Science Literacy/Numeracy is negatively correlated with concern (r = -0.12, p = 0.03).
Hence, polarization actually becomes larger, not smaller, as science literacy and numeracy increase (Fig.
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2; Table S4 & Fig. S3). Because the contribution that culture makes to disagreement grows as science
literacy and numeracy increase, it is not plausible to view cultural cognition as a heuristic substitute for
the knowledge or capacities that SCT views the public as lacking.
To test the generality of this conclusion, we also analyzed subjects’ perceptions of nuclear-power
risks. Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists were again polarized. Moreover, here,
too, the gap between subjects with these outlooks became larger, not smaller as scientific literacy and
numeracy increased (Table S5; Fig. S3). Extending research that casts doubt on the “knowledge deficit”
explanation16 for public controversy over climate-change and other environmental risks, these findings
suggest that “bounded rationality” is an unsatisfactory explanation as well.
On the contrary, our findings could be viewed as evidence of how remarkably well equipped ordinary individuals are to discern which stances toward scientific information secure their personal interests. We will elaborate on this interpretation, which we offer as our own best provisional understanding of
the results of this and related studies, but which we also believe warrants corroboration by experimental
testing. We stress, too, that as consequential as cultural cognition is for disagreement over climate change,
it does not imply the irrelevance of other, more general impediments to public engagement with climatechange science, including trust in communicators and the affective attenuation of risks seen by many as
remote in time and place 17.
For the ordinary individual, the most consequential effect of his beliefs about climate change is
likely to be on his relations with his peers18. A Hierarchical Individualist who expresses anxiety about
climate change might well be shunned by his coworkers at an oil refinery in Oklahoma City. A similar
fate will likely befall the Egalitarian Communitarian English professor who reveals to colleagues in Boston that she thinks the “scientific consensus” on climate change is a “hoax.” At the same time, neither the
personal beliefs an ordinary person forms about scientific evidence nor any actions he takes—as a consumer, say, or democratic voter—will by itself aggravate or mitigate the dangers of climate change: On
his own, he is just not consequential enough to matter 19. Given how much the ordinary individual depends on peers for support—material and emotional—and how little impact his beliefs have on the physi-
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cal environment, he would likely be best off if he formed risk perceptions that minimized any danger of
estrangement from his community.
A long-established body of work examining “motivated cognition” 20 supports this conjecture.
Both to avoid dissonance and to secure their group standing, individuals unconsciously seek out and credit information supportive of “[s]elf-defining . . . values [and] attitudes”21, such as the shared worldviews
featured in the study of cultural cognition22. The predictive power of cultural worldviews implies that the
average member of the public performs these tasks quite proficiently.
Our data, consistent with that observed in other settings 23, suggest that those with the highest degree of science literacy and numeracy perform such tasks even more discerningly. Fitting information to
identity-defining commitments makes demands on all manner of cognition—including both System 1 and
System 2 reasoning19-20. For ordinary citizens, the reward for acquiring greater scientific knowledge and
more reliable technical-reasoning capacities is a greater facility to discover and use—or explain away—
evidence relating to their groups’ positions.
Even if cultural cognition serves the personal interests of individuals, this form of reasoning can
have a highly negative impact on collective decision making. What guides individual risk perception, on
this account, is not the truth of those beliefs but rather their congruence with individuals’ cultural commitments. As a result, if beliefs about a societal risk such as climate change come to bear meanings congenial to some cultural outlooks but hostile to others, individuals motivated to adopt culturally congruent
risk perceptions will fail to converge, or at least fail to converge as rapidly as they should, on scientific
information essential to their common interests in health and prosperity. Although it is effectively costless
for any individual to form a perception of climate-change risk that is wrong but culturally congenial, it is
very harmful to collective welfare for individuals in aggregate to form beliefs this way.
One aim of science communication, we submit, should be to dispel this tragedy of the riskperception commons 24. A communication strategy that that focuses only on transmission of sound scientific information, our results suggest, is unlikely to do that. As worthwhile as it would be, simply improv-
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ing the clarity of scientific information will not dispel public conflict so long as the climate-change debate
continues to feature cultural meanings that divide citizens of opposing worldviews.
It does not follow, however, that nothing can be done to promote constructive and informed public deliberations. Because citizens understandably tend to conform their beliefs about societal risk to beliefs that predominate among their peers, communicators should endeavor to create a deliberative climate
in which accepting the best available science does not threaten any group’s values. Effective strategies
include use of culturally diverse communicators, whose affinity with different communities enhances
their credibility, and information-framing techniques that invest policy solutions with resonances congenial to diverse groups22. Perfecting such techniques through a new science of science communication is
a public good of singular importance 25.
Methods. Study subjects consisted of a nationally representative general population sample of
1540 Americans who participated in the study via the on-line testing facilities of Knowledge Networks.
Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States. It maintains an active respondent pool of some 50,000 adults
who are recruited to participate in online surveys and experiments administered on behalf of academic
and governmental researchers and private businesses. Its recruitment and sampling methods assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. population.
We measured respondents’ values using scales associated with studies of the “cultural theory of
risk”4-5. The first, Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (“Hierarchy”), consists of “agree-disagree” items that indicate
attitudes toward social orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such as gender, race, and class (“We need to dramatically reduce
inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women”). Items from
the second scale, Individualism-Communitarianism (“Individualism”), express attitudes toward social
orderings in which the individual is expected to secure his or her own well-being without assistance or
interference from society versus ones in which society is obliged and empowered to secure collective wel-
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fare in the face of competing individual interests (e.g., “Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society”).
We measured respondents’ “science literacy” with National Science Foundation’s “Science and
Engineering Indicators” 26. Focused on physics and biology (e.g., “Electrons are smaller than atoms
[true/false]”; “Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria [true/false]”), the NSF Indicators are widely used
as an index of public comprehension of basic science 27.
We measured subjects’ “numeracy”— their capacity to comprehend and use quantitative information—with fourteen mathematical word problems11, 28-29 (e.g., “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The
bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”). We combined responses to the NSF
Indicators and the numeracy questions into a composite scale (α = 0.85), labeled “Science Literacy/Numeracy,” to avoid collinearity in multivariate analyses of their association with respondents’ risk
perceptions 30.
Those risk perceptions were measured with GWRISK and NUKERISK, which asked respondents
to indicate “How much risk” they believed “climate change” and “nuclear power,” respectively, “pose[]
to human health, safety, or prosperity” on a 0 (“no risk”) to 10 (“extreme risk”) scale. Risk-perception
items that conform to this format are known to elicit responses that correlate highly with ones targeted at
more specific factual beliefs about the hazards of putative risk sources and are thus routinely used as a
parsimonious focus for analysis of variance in risk perceptions8-9.
Study hypotheses were tested by ordinary least squares linear regression (Table S4 & Table S5).
Predictors included the cultural worldview scales, Science Literacy/Numeracy, and appropriate crossproduct interaction terms. To promote visual comprehension of the variance associated with various predictors, responses to GWRISK (M = 5.7, SD = 3.4) and NUKERISK (M = 6.1, SD = 3.0) were transformed into z-scores.
Full item wording for all measures and the multivariate regression outputs are reported in the online Supplementary Information.
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1. Information on sample
1. Information on sample
The sample for this survey, conducted in January 2010, was 52% female, 76% white, and 8%
The sample for this survey, conducted in January 2010, was 52% female, 76% white, and 8%
African-American. The average age was 47 years. The median household income for the sample was
African-American. The average age was 47 years. The median household income for the sample was
$50,000-$59,000. The median educational level was “some college.”
$50,000-$59,000. The median educational level was “some college.”
2. Statistical power
2. Statistical power
The anticipated statistical analyses required a relatively large sample. Inferences drawn from the
The anticipated statistical analyses required a relatively large sample. Inferences drawn from the
absence of hypothesized effects (or the existence of hypothesized null effects), moreover, present a
absence of hypothesized effects (or the existence of hypothesized null effects), moreover, present a
significant risk of Type II error in underpowered studies 1. In addition, interactions between individual
significant risk of Type II error in underpowered studies 1. In addition, interactions between individual
characteristics such as cultural values and science literacy or numeracy tend to be small and thus to evade
characteristics such as cultural values and science literacy or numeracy tend to be small and thus to evade
detection in observational studies with modest-sized samples 2. The sample size used in this study was
detection in observational studies with modest-sized samples 2. The sample size used in this study was
sufficient to detect the significance (at p < 0.05) of even “small” effects (e.g., r = 0.10) at a power
sufficient to detect the significance (at p < 0.05) of even “small” effects (e.g., r = 0.10) at a power
exceeding the conventional 0.80 cutoff2, 3.
exceeding the conventional 0.80 cutoff2, 3.
3. Measures
3. Measures
a. Cultural worldviews. Subjects’ cultural values or “worldviews” were measured with items used
a. Cultural worldviews. Subjects’ cultural values or “worldviews” were measured with items used
in previous studies of cultural cognition4-5. These items characterize worldviews along two cross-cutting
in previous studies of cultural cognition4-5. These items characterize worldviews along two cross-cutting
dimensions:
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism
(“Hierarchy”)
and
Individualism-Communitarianism
dimensions:
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism
(“Hierarchy”)
and
Individualism-Communitarianism
(“Individualism”) (Table S1). The former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that
(“Individualism”) (Table S1). The former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that
connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics
connect authority to stratified social roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics
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such as gender, race, and class. The latter indicate attitudes toward social orderings that reflect an
expectation that individuals will secure their own well-being without assistance or interference from
society versus those that assign society the obligation to secure collective welfare and the power to
override competing individual interests. For all items, subjects indicated agreement or disagreement on a
six-point scale.

Cultural Cognition of Risk
Hierarchy
industry, technology: low risk
Restricting gun ownership:
high risk

Abortion procedure:
high risk
compulsory psychiatric treatment:
low risk

Individualism

Communitarianism
Abortion procedure:
low risk

industry, technology: high risk

compulsory psychiatric treatment:
high risk

Restricting gun ownership:
low risk

Egalitarianism
Fig. S1. Cultural cognition of risk. Studies of the cultural cognition of risk relate information-processing to
cultural worldviews. Worldviews—essentially preferences for how society and other collective undertakings should
be organized—are measured with two scales: “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” and “Individualism-Communitarianism.”
The theory on which cultural cognition is based posits that perceptions of environmental and technological risks
should be expected to diminish as worldviews become simultaneously more hierarchical and individualistic, and
increase as worldviews become simultaneously more egalitarian and communitarian. Other types of risks, including
ones relating to public health and social deviance, can be expected to vary more dramatically as worldviews become
progressively more hierarchical and communitarian or progressively more egalitarian and individualistic. Survey
and experimental studies have found support for these predictions
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For this study, we used short-form versions of Hierarchy and Individualism (Table S1), each of
which consisted of six items 9. Like the full-form versions, the two six-item sets formed reliable scales
(Hierarchy, α = 0.84; Individualism, α = 0.76), the items of which loaded appropriately on two separate
factors, which were labeled “Hierarchy” and “Individualism” and used as predictors for the study.

Individualism-Communitarianism (Individualism)
IINTRSTS.

The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.

CHARM.

Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting
themselves.

IPROTECT.

It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves.

IPRIVACY.

The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.

CPROTECT.

The government should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means
limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.

CLIMCHOI.

Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don’t get
in the way of what’s good for society.

Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (Hierarchy)
HEQUAL.

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.

EWEALTH.

Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.

ERADEQ.

We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and
people of color, and men and women.

EDISCRIM.

Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.

HREVDIS2.

It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don’t want equal rights,
they want special rights just for them.

HFEMININ.

Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.

Table S1. Cultural-worldview items.

b. Numeracy. Respondents’ numeracy—their proficiency in understanding quantitative
information and engaging in mathematical reasoning10- 13—was measured with a set of 14 questions used
in previous studies (Table S2). Item responses formed a reliable scale (α = 0.85), which was labeled
“Numeracy.”
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% correct

Item
EVENROLL.

Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. (That would mean
that we roll one die from a pair of dice.) Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times
do you think the die would come up as an even number?

58%

PCTTOFREQUENCY1.

In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are
1%. What is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00
prize if 1,000 people each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?

60%

FREQUENCYTOPCT1.

In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car
is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING
SWEEPSTAKES win a car?

28%

COMPFREQUENCY.

Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a
disease?

86%

COMPPCT.

Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a
disease?

88%

DOUBLEPCT.

If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s
risk is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?

64%

DOUBLEFREQUENCY.

If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person
B’s risk is double that of A, what is B’s risk?

21%

PCTTOFREQUENCY2.

If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be
expected to get the disease:

A:

Out of 100?

B:

Out of 1000?

FREQUENCYTOPCT2.

If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same
as having a __% chance of getting the disease.

72%

VIRAL.

The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about
how many of them are expected to get infected?

48%

BAYESIAN.

Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must
have a mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a
malignant tumor and 90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually
have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly that 9 of them have a
tumor and indicates incorrectly that 1 of them does not have a tumor. Of the
90 women who do not have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly
that 81 of them do not have a tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of them
do have a tumor. The table below summarizes all of this information.
Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the
likelihood that she actually has a tumor?

84%
81%

SHANE1.
SHANE2.

A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?
In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it
take for the patch to cover half of the lake?

3%
12%

27%

Table S2. Numeracy measures and responses. N = 1540.
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Numeracy was weakly associated with cultural outlooks. The correlation between Numeracy and
Hierarchy was 0.14, and between Numeracy and Individualism was -0.07 (p < .01, in both cases). For
Hierarchical Individualists, the mean score was 8.0 (SEM = 0.15), and for Egalitarian Communitarians 7.5
(SEM = 0.18).
c. Science literacy. To measure science literacy, subjects were asked a set of questions drawn
from the National Science Foundation’s “Science and Engineering Indicators” 14. The indicators have been
widely used over a long period of time and across a large number of societies as an index of public
comprehension of basic science 15. We included eight NSF Indicator items in the survey (Table S3). The
mean number of correct responses was 5.9 (SD = 1.86). Responses formed a modestly reliable scale
(α = 0.62), which was labeled Sciliteracy. There was a small but significant positive correlation between
this variable and Hierarchy (r = 0.09, p < 0.01), and a small, nonsignificant one between it and
Individualism (r = 0.03, p = 0.17). The mean Sciliteracy score was 6.3 (SEM = 0.09) for Hierarchical
Individualists, and 6.0 (SEM = 0.10) for Egalitarian Communitarians.
items

% correct

EARTHOT

The center of the Earth is very hot [true/false].

86%

HUMANRADIO

All radioactivity is man-made [true/false].

84%

LASERS

Lasers work by focusing sound waves [true/false].

68%

ELECATOM

Electrons are smaller than atoms [true/false].

62%

COPERNICUS1

Does the Earth go around the Sun, or does the Sun go around the Earth?

72%

COPERNICUS2

How long does it take for the Earth to go around the Sun? [one day, one month, one year]

45%

DADGENDER

It is the father’s gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl [true/false].

69%

ANTIBIOTICS

Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria [true/false].

68%

Table S3. Science literacy items. N = 1540. Consistent with the NSF Science Indicators scoring method,
COPERNICUS2 was administered only to subjects who correctly answered COPERNICUS1.

3. Multivariate analyses
We performed two sets of multivariate regression analyses to test the various hypotheses
associated with SCT. The outcome variables were GWRISK and NUKERISK, which asked respondents
to indicate “How much risk” they believed “climate change” and “nuclear power,” respectively, “pose[]
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to human health, safety, or prosperity” on a 0 (“no risk”) to 10 (“extreme risk”) scale. To improve visual
comprehension of the variance associated with various predictors, responses to GWRISK (M = 5.7,
SD = 3.4) and NUKERISK (M = 6.1, SD = 3.0) were transformed into z-scores.
We combined Sciliteracy and Numeracy into a composite scale (α = 0.85), labeled “Science
Literacy/Numeracy,” to avoid collinearity in analyses of their association with the outcome variables 16.
The z-score transformation of Science Literacy/Numeracy (z_Sci/Num) was used as a predictor in the
regression analyses in order to center the variable at 0 and thereby enhance the interpretability of models
with cross-product interaction terms. In addition, cross-product variables (“Hierarch x z_Sci/Num” and
“Individ x z_Sci/Num”) were constructed to test for interactions between Science Literacy/Numeracy and
the two worldview measures 17.
Climate Change
Model 1
Model 2
(-3.35)
-0.03
(-1.43)
-0.09
-0.46 (-21.06)
-0.30 (-13.97)

z_Sci/Num
Hierarch
Individ
Hierarch x z_Sci/Num
Individ x z_Sci/Num
Constant
0.00 (-0.02)
2
R
0.01
F
(1, 1538) 11.23
ΔF

0.00 (0.00)
0.30
(3, 1536) 221.99
(2, 1536) 320.73

Model 3
-0.04 (-1.70)
-0.46 (-20.41)
-0.30 (-13.57)
-0.05 (-2.30)
-0.02 (-1.12)
0.00 (0.14)
0.31
(5, 1534) 134.62
(2, 1537) 3.10

Table S4. Multivariate regression analysis of climate change risk perceptions. N = 1540. The effects of the
model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with t-statistic indicated
parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to GWRISK. Bolded indicates that the
coefficient, F-statistic, or the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Note that because all predictors are
centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator variables in models that contain crossproduct interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value17. Missing
18

values for individual cultural-worldview items and for GWRISK were replaced using multiple imputation .
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Sequential models were used to test the impact of Science Literacy/Numeracy, the cultural
worldviews, and the interactions of these variables. In the first step, risk perceptions were regressed on
Science Literacy/Numeracy alone, which predicted less concern for both climate-change (Table S4,
Model 1) and nuclear risk perceptions (Table S5, Model 1).
The cultural-worldview variables were entered next. Both Hierarchy and Individualism predicted
less concern for the two forms of risk perception (Table S4, Model 2; Table S5, Model 2).
The analyses associated with Model 2 show the impact of the cultural outlooks controlling for
differences in the level of science literacy and numeracy. The large and statistically significant impact of
the worldview predictors thus confirms that the contribution they make to variance in perceptions of
climate change risk is not a consequence of differences in science literacy or numeracy levels among
subjects with one or the other of these worldviews.
In the final step, variables to test for the interaction between science literacy and numeracy, on
the one hand, and the cultural-worldview variables, on the other, were added to the analyses (Table S4,
Model 3; Table S5, Model 3). In both models, the coefficients for the cross-product terms are negative
(indicating that the impact of Hierarchy and Individualism in reducing climate-change and nuclear-power
risk perceptions increases as Sci/Num increases). Although only one of the individual cross-product
interaction terms is significant on its own in each analysis, the combined effect of the cross-product
interaction terms as a set was significant for both, as confirmed by the significance change in F-statistic in
Model 3 of the respective analyses 19. The joint effect sizes of these interactions were in line with ones
commonly detected in observational studies2.
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Model 1
-0.30 (-12.06)

z_Sci/Num
Hierarch
Individ
Hierarch x z_Sci/Num
Individ x z_Sci/Num
Constant
0.00 (0.03)
2
R
0.09
F
(1, 1538) 145.34
ΔF

Nuclear Power
Model 2
-0.27 (-11.18)
-0.24 (-9.82)
-0.12 (-4.86)

0.00 (-0.05)
0.15
(3, 1536) 91.39
(2, 1536) 59.44

Model 3
-0.28 (-11.40)
-0.23 (-9.28)
-0.11 (-4.59)
-0.04 (-1.59)
-0.05 (-2.31)
0.00 (0.09)
0.16
(5, 1534) 56.48
(2, 1537) 3.80

Table S5. Multivariate regression analyses of nuclear power risk perceptions. N = 1540. The effects of the
model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with t-statistic indicated
parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to NUKERISK. Bolded indicates that
the coefficient, F-statistic, or the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Note that because all predictors are
centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator variables in models that contain crossproduct interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value17. Missing
values for individual cultural-worldview items and for NUKERISK were replaced using multiple imputation18.

Because the impact of even the nonsignificant predictors can result in a significant effect when
aggregated consistent with study hypotheses, the most straightforward and informative means to test the
hypotheses is to use the regression model to estimate the impact (including confidence intervals) of
relevant combinations of predictors20-21. Such estimates, based on Model 3 of the respective regression
analyses, are reported graphically in Fig. S2. The results confirm the lack of support for the conclusion
that science literacy and numeracy predict increased risk concern for climate-change risk perceptions. The
results also confirm that the cultural-worldview variables predict both sets of risk perceptions
independently of science literacy and numeracy (that is, when Science Literacy/Numeracy is controlled
for by being set to its mean).
Finally, they demonstrate that as science literacy and numeracy (as reflected in Science
Literacy/Numeracy) increase, cultural polarization increases for both climate-change risk perceptions and
nuclear-power risk perceptions (Fig. S3). Higher levels of science literacy and numeracy predict a more

NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange

© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.

8

substantial abatement of concern over nuclear-power risks (b = 0.30, p < 0.01) than over climate-change
risk (b = -0.09, p < 0.01). This effect, however, is significantly more pronounced among subjects whose
worldviews are hierarchical and individualist than among those whose worldviews are egalitarian and
communitarian (Fig. S3). Thus, for nuclear-power risk perceptions, as for climate-change risk
perceptions, polarization grows as science literacy and numeracy increase (Fig. S3).

Greater 1.00

perceived risk (z-score)

0.75

Climate Change (GWRISK)

Nuclear Power (NUKERISK)

Egalitarian Communitarian
Egalitarian Communitarian

0.50
0.25
0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75

Lesser -1.00

Hierarchical Individualist
Science literacy/numeracy

Hierarchical Individualist
Science literacy/numeracy

Fig. S2. Impact of the interaction between science literacy and numeracy, on the one hand, and cultural
worldviews, on the other, for climate-change and nuclear-power risk perceptions. N = 1540. Derived from
regression analysis reported in Table S4, Model 3, and Table S5, Model 3. “Hierarchical individualist” and
“Egalitarian communitarian” reflect values set, respectively, at +1 SD and -1 SD on both the Hierarchy and
Individualism cultural-worldview scale predictors. “Low” and “high” reflect values set at -1 SD and +1 SD on
Science/Numeracy scale, a composite scale based on respondents’ science literacy and numeracy scores. Responses
on 0-10 risk scales (GWRISK: M =5.7, SD = 3.4; NUKERISK: M = 6.1, SD = 3.0) were converted to z-scores to
promote ease of interpretation. CIs reflect 0.95 level of confidence.
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Increase in polarization

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

Climate change

Nuclear Power

Fig. S3. Multivariate regression estimates of increased polarization associated with increased numeracy and
science literacy. Estimates derived from Model 3 of the regression outputs reported in Table S4 & Table S5,
respectively. Bars indicate how much larger cultural polarization is when science-literacy and numeracy are high as
opposed to low. The estimates are derived by comparing how much larger the difference in the estimated values of
the outcome variable between “Hierarchical Individualist” (+1 SD on both worldview scales) and “Egalitarian
Communitarian” (-1 SD on both scales) are when (1) the predictor value for Science Literacy/Numeracy is set at a
“high” value (+1 SD) than it is when (2) the predictor value for Science Literacy/Numeracy is set at a “low” value
(-1 SD), with product-interaction term values being correspondingly. CIs indicate 0.95 level of confidence.

4. Political-orientation measures compared to cultural-worldview ones
We also collected data on our subjects’ political orientations. For this purpose, we used two
items: REPUB, a 7-point measure (“Strong Democrat, Democrat, Leans Democrat, Independent/other,
Leans Republican, Republican, and Strong Republican”) of partisan self-identification (M = 3.72,
SD = 2.13); and CONSERV, a 7-point measure (“Strongly Liberal, Liberal, Weakly Liberal, Middle of
the Road, Weakly Conservative, Conservative, or Strongly Conservative”) of self-reported liberalconservative ideology (M = 4.13, SD = 1.49). We present analyses intended to enable readers and
researchers who are more familiar with or who otherwise prefer political-orientation measures to assess
our findings.
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a. Political orientations in relation to cultural worldviews. In the main text, we report means and
regression estimates for the “typical Egalitarian Communitarian” and the “typical Hierarchical
Individualist.” As an expositional device—one that identifies the subsets of study respondents in whom
sample-wide variance is most strongly concentrated—this is equivalent to reporting similar data for
subsamples who self-identify as “Republicans” and “Democrats” or as “liberals” and “conservatives”
when political orientation measures are used to analyze variance (e.g., Krosnick, Holbrook, & Visser
2000).
The cultural-worldview measures are moderately correlated with the political orientation
measures. Thus, in our sample both Hierarchy (r = 0.48, p < 0.01) and Individualism (r = 0.23, p < 0.01)
are positively correlated with REPUB. Both are also positively correlated with CONSERV (Hierarchy:
r = 0.47, p < 0.01; Individualism, r = 0.23, p < 0.01).
Nevertheless, in our sample, subjects whom we would characterize as “Egalitarian
Communitarians” and “Hierarchal Individualists” (based on the relationship of their Hierarchy and
Individualism scores to the means on the worldview scales) are more moderate in their political
orientations than the ones who self-identify as “Democrat” or “Republican,” or as “liberal” or
“conservative” without qualification (Fig. S4). The mean REPUB and CONSERV scores of Hierarchical
Individualists (M = 5.18, SEM = 0.09; M = 5.10, SEM = 0.06, respectively) equate approximately to an
“Independent or other” who “leans Republican” and who is “slightly conservative.” Scores of Egalitarian
Communitarians (M = 2.60, SEM = 0.09; M = 3.34, SEM = 0.08, respectively) equate approximately to an
“Independent or other” who “leans Democrat” and who is “slightly Liberal.
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Fig. S4. Relation of cultural outlooks to political orientations. Figures plot normal-density distributions for
respones to CONSERV (M = 4.13, SD = 1.49) and REPUB (M = 3.71, SD = 2.13). Red lines indicate the mean
scores on the indicated measures for subjects classified as either Egalitarian Communitarian or Hierarchal
Individualist (based on the relationship of their Hierarchy and Individualism scores to the means on the worldview
scales). The solid black line indicates the sample mean, and the dotted red lines the values for ±1 standard deviation,
on each scale.

b. Explanatory power for climate-change risk perceptions. Table S6 reports parallel multivariate
regressions in which the political-orientation measures and cultural-worldview measures are treated as
predictors of climate-change risk perceptions. Differences in political orientation, the analyses suggests,
generate less disagreement in climate-change risk perceptions than do comparable differences in cultural
worldview. Specifically, the estimated difference in the z_GWRISK scores when the values for REPUB
and CONSERV predictors were both set at -1 SD (illustrative values for a typical “Liberal Democrat”), on
the one hand, and +1 SD (values for a typical “Conservative Republican”), on the other, was 1.09 (tstatistic = -21.93, p < 0.01). The estimated difference in the z_GWRISK scores when the values for
Hierarchy and Individualism predictors were both set at -1 SD (illustrative values for a typical
“Egalitarian Communitarian”), on the one hand, and +1 SD (values for a typical “Hierarchical
Conservative”), on the other, was 1.54 (t-statistic = -25.15, p < 0.01).
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When the values for REPUB and CONSERV were set at levels corresponding to the scores of the
average Hierarchical Individualist (5.18 and 5.10) and Egalitarian Communitarian (2.60 and 3.34), the
predicted difference in risk perceptions was even more modest (ΔEM = -0.66, t-statistic = 22.02, p <
0.01). A model based only on political orientation predictors, then, would thus substantially underestimate
the degree of polarization that exists between typical Hierarchical Individualists, on the one hand, and the
typical Egalitarian Communitarians, on the other (Fig. S5).
Model 1
z_Republican
z_Conservative

-0.21

(-7.74)

-0.19

(-6.93)

-0.07

(-2.44)

Individualism
R

2

F

Model 3

-0.35

Hierarchy
Constant

Model 2

(-12.54)

0.00

(0.87)

-0.47

(-21.52)

-0.33

(-13.12)

-0.30
0.00

(-13.92)

-0.24
0.00

(-10.75)

0.24
(2, 1537)

(0.99)

0.31
244.35

(2, 1537)

(0.91)

0.35
327.53

ΔF

(4, 1535)

201.84

(2, 1535)

51.64

Table S6. Impact of political orientations and of cultural worldviews on climate change risk perceptions. N =
1540. The effects of the model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with tstatistic indicated parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to GWRISK. Bolded
indicates that the coefficient, F-statistic , or the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Missing values were
replaced using multiple imputation18.

This reflects the greater precision of the cultural-worldview measures in identifying sources of
variance within the sample. Adding cultural-worldview measures to a model with political-orientation
measures (Table S6, Model 3 vs. Model 1) increases overall explanatory power by approximately 50%
(Δ R2 = 0.11, Δ F-statistic (2, 1535) = 51.64, p < 0.01), whereas adding the political-orientation measures
to a model with cultural-worldview measures (Table S6, Model 3 vs. Model 2) increases explanatory
power by only 13% (Δ R2 = 0.04, Δ F-statistic (2, 1535) = 26.67, p = < 001).
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Fig. S5. Comparison of dispositional measures of climate-change risk perception. Point estimates are response
to GWRISK risk-perception item (converted to z-score). Comparison of “Conservative Republican” and “Liberal
Democrat” sets the values for both CONSERV and REPUB at -1 SD and +1 SD, respectively (derived from Table
S6, Model 1).

Comparison of “Egalitarian Communitarian based on cultural worldview” and “Hierarchical

Individualist based on cultural worldview” sets the values for Hierarchy and Individualism at -1 SD and +1 SD,
respectively (derived from Table S6, Model 2). Comparison of “estimate for Hierarch Individ based on political
orientation” and “estimate for Egal Commun based on political orientation” sets the values for REPUB and
CONSERV at mean scores of Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists on those measures,
respectively (derived from Table S6, Model 1), and hence represents an estimate of how divided individuals with
those cultural worldviews would be if one lacked information about their cultural worldviews and had information
only about their political orientations. CIs indicate 0.95 level of confidence.

c. Science Literacy and numeracy. We also created parallel models to examine whether the
political-orientation measures, like the cultural-worldview ones we used in our study, interact with
Science literacy/Numeracy (Table S7). They do.
Because results for analyses performed separately for the two risk perception measures generated
near-identical results, we present a single analysis based on ENVRISK, a composite environmental-risk
perception measure formed by summing the z-score responses to GWRISK and NUKERISK (α = 0.57).
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We then constructed parallel models in which, first, Science Literacy/Numeracy plus the relevant
dispositional variables—the cultural-worldview measures or the political-orientation measures—and,
thereafter, cross-product interaction terms were entered in sequence.
Table S7, Model 1 reproduces the results featured in the main text. Controlling for Science
Literacy/Numeracy (Table S7, Model 1(a)), both worldview predictors strongly predict reduced concern
with environmental risk. Both cross-product interaction terms (Model 1(b)) are significant and have
negative signs, indicating that as Science Literacy/Numeracy increases, the risk-skepticism associated
with Hierarchy and Individualism (and correspondingly the risk-sensitivity associated with Egalitarianism
and Communitarianism) increase.
Model 2 shows similar results for the political-orientation variables. Both political orientation
measures strongly predict reduced concern with environmental risk even controlling for Science
Literacy/Numeracy. The cross-product interaction terms are both negative. Although z_Sci/num x
REPUB is not significant on its own (b = -0.04, t-statistic = -1.31, p = 0.19), the significant change in Fstatistic confirms that the joint effect of the cross-product terms is19. Accordingly, as respondents Science
Literacy/Numeracy scores increase, so does the gap in risk perceptions associated with variance in the
political-orientation variables.
Finally, Model 3 combines the two alternative sets of dispositional variables. The culturalworldview predictors explain more variance. The addition of the cultural-worldview predictors to a model
containing only Science Literacy/Numeracy and the political-orientation measures increases explanatory
power by about 50% (Δ R2 = 0.11, Δ F-statistic (2, 1535) = 104.84, p = < 001), whereas the addition of
the political-orientation measures to a model containing only the cultural-worldview predictors and
Science Literacy/Numeracy increases explanatory power by about 11% ((Δ R2 = 0.03, Δ F-statistic (2,
1535) = 22.89, p = < 001.
Model 3(b) adds cross-product interaction terms. All have negative signs. Moreover, although
none of the individual predictor coefficients are statistically significant, their joint effect is statistically
significant, as indicated by the significant change in the F-statistic for Model 3(b). Accordingly, it can be
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inferred that Science Literacy/Numeracy magnifies polarization as respondents become simultaneously
more hierarchical, more individualistic, more conservative, and more Republican, on the one hand, and
more egalitarian, more communitarian, and more liberal, on the other.
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Model 1

Model 2

a

b

Model 3

a

b

-0.18

(-8.16)

-0.19

(-8.49)

-0.17

(-7.67)

-0.18

(-8.14)

Hierarchy

-0.42

(-18.62)

-0.41

(-17.93)

-0.33

(-12.66)

-0.32

(-12.06)

Individualism

-0.25

(-11.40)

-0.25

(-11.03)

-0.21

(-9.14)

-0.20

(-8.71)

-0.08

(-5.88)

z_Republican
z_Conservative

-0.19

(-8.64)

b

z_Sci/Num

-0.18

(-7.67)

a

-0.29

(-10.27)

-0.29

(-9.68)

-0.08

(-5.80)

-0.14

(-4.82)

-0.13

(-4.41)

-0.01

(-0.48)

0.00

(-0.09)

Hier x z_Sci/Num

-0.05

(-2.39)

-0.01

(-0.44)

Indiv x z_Sci/Num

-0.05

(-2.17)

-0.03

(-1.24)

-0.04

(-1.37)

-0.04

(-1.31)

0.00

(0.25)

z_Repub x z_Sci/Num
z_Conserv x z_Sci/Num
Constant
R

2

F
ΔF

0.00

(-0.12)

0.28
(3, 1536)

0.00

(0.14)

0.29
198.39

0.00

-0.03

0.20

(5, 1534)

121.97

(2, 1534)

5.00

(3, 1536)

-0.03

(-1.31)

-0.10

(-3.57)

0.02

(0.54)

0.21
132.56

0.00

(0.97)

0.31

(5, 1534)

87.95

(2, 1534)

16.41

(5, 1534)

0.32
132.30

(9, 1530)

75.62

(4, 1530)

3.93

Table S7. Environmental risk perceptions. N = 1540. The effects of the model predictors are expressed in unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with tstatistic indicated parenthetically. The outcome variable is the standardized (z-score) response to ENVRISK. Bolded indicates that the coefficient, F-statistic , or
the change in F-statistic is significant at p < 0.05. Note that because all predictors are centered at 0, the regression coefficients for the predictor and moderator
variables in models that contain cross-product interaction terms indicate the effect of the relevant variable when the other is at its mean value17. Missing values
for individual cultural worldview items, for political orientation variables, and for indicators of ENVRISK were replaced using multiple imputation18.
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